On July 1, Anthropic, after 19 days of being paused, officially re-deployed Claude Fable 5. The direct trigger was the US government imposing export controls on Fable 5 and Mythos 5 on June 12 citing "cybersecurity risks", and the technical trigger was a prompt technique in an Amazon security researcher report. After internal retesting, Anthropic admits: the same vulnerability can be reproduced on Haiku 4.5, Sonnet 4.6, Opus 4.6/4.7/4.8, GPT-5.4/5.5, Kimi K2.7, and the same Exploit code can be written for all of them. Blacklisting the strongest model fundamentally doesn't stop the underlying capability from spreading — this is the real "anti-climax" of the event. The key to the relaunch isn't "stricter guardrails", but a new trained targeted safety classifier that pulls the interception rate of the trigger path in the report to 99%+; intercepted requests automatically fall back to Opus 4.8, at the cost of a noticeable increase in "collateral damage" in routine debugging. CAISI's re-audit passes, controls are lifted on June 30, and Fable 5 fully returns on July 1, with AWS, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Foundry quickly restoring access. More noteworthy is the "jailbreak severity consensus framework" jointly released by Anthropic with partners including Amazon, Microsoft, and Google: four dimensions scoring each jailbreak, the most severe tier "confirmation immediately deploys mitigation", with HackerOne synchronously opening a submission channel, and a 24/7 monitoring team in place. This play is more engineering-flavored than the "stronger model = more dangerous" slogan. It assumes the safety classifier will fail, jailbreaks will definitely appear, but makes "how to release the strongest model under known failure conditions" an industrial process that is quantifiable and auditable for the first time.